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I. INTRODUCTION
Everybody remembers "Chicken Little.'1 While journeying home, an acorn
pounced on her head, prompting the unforgettable battle-cry: "The sky is
falling!" Terrified by the fantasized threat to her community, the fuzzy little
fowl attracted the attention of many colleagues. Chicken Little's convincing
posture soon triggered an avalanche of chain-reaction panic. Alas, the cunning
Foxy Loxy understood their ill-fated logic. Nevertheless, Chicken Little and her
foolish flock warned the world of imminent doom, barely escaping Foxy Loxy's
evil plans.
Although Chicken Little's knee-jerk assumption was eventually disproved
by science, her spirit has been revitalized by tort reformists who busy
themselves convincing the country that plaintiff victories in court are
contributing to the demise of the modern corporation. In this view,
million-dollar verdicts, like Chicken Little's bump on the head, are crippling
industry and signal the need for restrictive regulation. Thus, the scientific
expert has been singled out as the acorn causing the problem, and the modem
IFor the modernized, American version of this timeless children's tale, see STEVEN
KELLOGG, CHICKEN LITTLE (1985).
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Chicken Little has been courting government assistance in a quest to halt the
expert's influence in the courtroom.2
Although debate on standards for the admissibility of expert testimony is
not a new motif in legal academia,3 contemporary critics have been quick to
blame so-called "junk science"4 and inadequate policing of the scientific expert
2 The Bush administration responded by attempting to narrow the standards for
admissibility of scientific evidence which became the cornerstone of its "war on the legal
system." In 1991, former Vice-President Dan Quayle's Council on Competitiveness
released a broad program for "reform" of the tort system. Six of the Council's fifty specific
proposals were aimed at curtailing the use of scientific expert witnesses by plaintiffs. In
his report, the former Vice-President aimed at the jugular of the legal profession by
attacking its overuse of scientific experts:
Expert Witnesses and "Junk Science"
An area of the law particularly ripe for [judicial] reform is expert
witness practice. The Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern most
expert testimony, eliminated many of the common law restrictions on
the use of expert witnesses. The resulting uncontrolled use of expert
witnesses has led to longer trials, more expensive litigation, and a re-
duction in the quality of expert testimony in many cases.
It has also allowed "junk science" to tarnish the legal process. Peter
Huber, a leading observer of American courtrooms, has written recently
that "scientific frauds ... are attempted almost daily in our courts, and
many succeed." Huber wrote that "the most fantastic verdict recorded so
far was worthy of a tabloid:"
"With the backing of 'expert' testimony from a doctor and police depart-
ment officials, a soothsayer who decided she had lost her psychic powers
following a CAT scan persuaded a Philadelphia jury to award her $1
million."
Stories such as these are becoming almost commonplace. "Expert"
witnesses regularly offer their "scientific" opinions on the connections
between automobile accidents and breast cancer or environmental
pollutants and "chemically induced AIDS."
Proposed Civil Justice Reform Legislation, Agenda for Civil Justice in America, 60 U. CIN.
L. REV. 979,984 (1992) (omissions in original). Although the Clinton administration has
not taken a position on this issue to date, congressional action regarding reform of expert
witness practice is still quite possible. See infra text accompanying notes 196-203.
3 See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, A Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980); Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the
Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554 (1983); Historical and Practical
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901); Mason Ladd,
Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414 (1952); Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert
Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 (1986); Note, Fit to be Fryed: Frye v. United States and
the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 77 Ky. L.J. 849 (1988-89).
4The term "junk science" was coined by Peter A. Huber, Senior Fellow of the
Manhattan Institute and outspoken critic of scientific expert witness practice. See PETER
HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). Mr. Huber views
experts who are on the outside of the scientific mainstream, as well as the trial lawyers
who employ them, as clear and present dangers to "good science" and appropriate
litigation outcomes in toxic tort litigation. See Robert F. Blomquist, Science, Toxic Tort
Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter Huber, 44 ARK. L. REV. 629 (1991). See also
Kenneth J. Cheseboro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
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as a significant cause of the "litigation explosion." Fearing the ravages of
"untrained jurors bamboozled by smooth-talking scientific charlatans,"5 critics
contend that unfounded scientific testimony regarding causation has
infiltrated America's courtrooms and, if unchecked, will continue imposing
liability on entities in specious claims. Especially in toxic tort litigation, 6 where
the stakes are high and causation is often the decisive issue, critics have seized
on new scientific techniques of proof as the most glaring example of overuse
and abuse of science in the courtroom.
The dilemma as to how attorneys, scientists, judges, and jurors are to handle
novel forms of expert testimony has become so divisive that either the Supreme
Court or Congress will soon enter the polemic. Since the D.C. Circuit
announcement of Frye v. United States7 in 1923, and the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975,8 the federal courts have been caught between two
standards for determining the admissibility of expert testimony.
Under the current9 Federal Rules, the determination of admissibility of
expert testimony requires affirmative answers to two relatively simple
questions. 10 First, is the proffered expert "qualified," and second, will the
expert's "specialized knowledge ... assist the trier of fact to understand the
1637,1722 (1993) (critically analyzing Huber's GALILEO'S REVENGE, and concluding that
the book "employs distortion of the facts of cases and of the content of legal doctrines,
including an ignorance of controlling constitutional principles."). For other treatises
written by Huber debunking tort law and the use of expert witnesses, see PETER HUBER,
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Peter Huber, On Law
and Sciosophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 319 (1990).
5 Peter A. Bell, Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Cone,
20 PROD. SAFETY & LiAB. REP. (BNA) 47, 47 (1992) (Part I of a two-part article).
6 One of the first judicial opinions to use the phrase "toxic torts" was In re Agent
Orange Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 737, 743 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). For further
discussion of the Agent Orange litigation, see PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON
TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986).
The field of toxic tort law has exploded in the past fifteen years. See generally Toxic
TORTS AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: CHANGING TACTICS FOR CHANGING TIMES 11 (M. Brown
ed. 1989) (toxic tort actions typically involve plaintiffs who "contend that they have
sustained actual or potential physical injuries ... which were caused by substances in
the air, ground and water.); see also 1 A GUIDE TO TOXIC TORTS M. SEARCY § 1.01 (1989);
Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458 (1986).
7293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
8FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Pub. L. No. 93-595,88 Stat. 1926(1975) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. app. (1988) (amended 1989)).
9 See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
1OThis is, of course, presuming that the initial relevancy requirements have been met.
"Relevance" is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. The Rules mandate that "all relevant
evidence is admissible," subject to enumerated exceptions, and "evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible." Id. at 402.
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evidence or determine a fact in issue? 11 Thus, the focus is on the helpfulness
of the testimony, and the logical trend should be easy admissibility.12 But under
the common law Frye standard, expert scientific opinion evidence is
inadmissible unless it has been "sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance" in the relevant scientific community.13 The Circuit Courts disagree
as to the extent that the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded the
common law evidentiary doctrine.14 That disagreement is evidenced by the
courts' struggle with the issue of whether the Frye doctrine has survived the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
On October 13, 1992, the United States Supreme Court issued a Writ of
Certiorari to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 1s to resolve the split and
answer vexing questions at the heart of the furor surrounding "junk science."
Nevertheless, even the most conservative decision by the Supreme Court may
not quell the disturbance. With the support of the Bush administration,16
proponents of reform of expert witness practice are urging Congress to amend
the current Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The proposal17 is highly restrictive,
and represents the belief that allowing the trial judge to actively screen
11FED. R. EVID. 702. The Rule provides: "If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
12 See Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules On Admissibility
of Scientific Evidence: A Judge's Perspective, 115 F.R.D. 112 (1987); see also Jack B. Weinstein,
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631
(1991).
13 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14 Three circuits have ruled that the Frye standard has not survived the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence: United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794-97 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d
941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1019 (1975). Six Circuits have ruled that the Frye standard has survived the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939
F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1991);
United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted, vacated, 925
F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817
(1987); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195,1203 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
906 (1986); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992), and vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
15 This Note was completed prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). For a discussion
and critique of the Court's holding in Daubert, see infra notes 206-39 and accompanying
text.
16 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
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challenged expert testimony will reduce litigation costs and curtail
"commonplace abuses" in the utilization of expert witnesses. 18
This note focuses on the current controversy over admissibility standards
for novel scientific testimony. It will trace the development of legal standards
for expert witness admissibility from the common law through the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and to the current trend of strict judicial
scrutiny. In addition, this note will analyze the issues before the United States
Supreme Court in Daubert and will argue, in spite of indications to the
contrary,19 that the Court should not be too quick to continue tightening the
judicial noose on scientific experts. Finally, this note will dispute the utility of
amending Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and will argue that the potential harm
of that proposition will have devastating effects on the jury trial which
substantially outweigh its laudable aims.
Through this analysis it will become apparent that the current trend of strict
judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence not only betrays the notion of civil justice,
but has grown through knee-jerk assumptions ascribing scientific evidence as
responsible for the "disappearance of valuable and perhaps even life-saving
products and services. "20 Like Chicken Little's provocation of chain-reaction
panic, strict scrutinists have been highly successful in persuading lawmakers
to pay less attention to potentially dangerous and life-threatening products and
services by dismissing questionable industries as the real cause of successful
lawsuits. To be sure, if the trend continues, industry will certainly thrive at the
expense of the consumer; and modem fans of Chicken Little will be placed in
the ironic position of cheering for Foxy Loxy.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERT EVIDENCE STANDARDS
A. Common Law Standards
At common law, courts admitted the opinions of experts under limited
circumstances. The fear that juries might be overwhelmed and hence confused,
18 Because this note was completed prior to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), it must
be noted that formal discussions regarding the proposal to amend Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 were halted pending the High Court's proclamation. Since the decision in
Daubert the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee has not, as of the date of thepublication
of this note, begun the task of reconsidering the proposal. According to Professor
Margaret Berger, Reporter to the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, any proposal to
amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702 must be reconsidered in light of Daubert and, if
such proposal should be adopted, it could not become effective for a number of years.
Telephone Interview with Professor Margaret Berger, Reporter to the Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee (Apr. 13, 1994).
19 See supra note 15.
20 HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 4, at 5.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
or unduly impressed and thus biased, had much to do with these restrictions.21
First, experts were allowed to testify only when the subject matter of that
testimony was deemed to be outside of the common knowledge or experience
of the ordinary person.22 Therefore, expert testimony was inadmissible unless
the court believed that jurors could not decide a factual issue without technical
assistance.2 3 Second, courts often excluded expert witnesses if the opinion was
one which embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.24 Thus,
ultimate issue opinions were inadmissible as an invasion and usurpation of the
jury's province.25 Third, in order to assist the trier of fact in its evaluation of
the expert's opinion, the basis of that opinion must have been disclosed by the
party calling the witness prior to offering the opinion.26 Therefore if the jury
rejected the premises as untrue, it must have rejected the testimonial conclusion
as well. 27 Finally, the admittance of expert testimony at common law required
the expert's opinion to be framed from a hypothetical question assuming
certain evidentiary circumstances. 28 This requirement avoided the need for the
expert to weigh the evidence in issue, a practice precluded by common law
courts.2
9
The restrictions placed on expert witnesses at common law were criticized
as cumbersome, too restrictive, and contrary to the adversarial process.30 For
example, Wigmore criticized the view that experts should be allowed to testify
only in instances where the proffered testimony was outside the common
knowledge of lay persons:
21 Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 51.
22Id. at 48.
23Id.
241d. at 49. (citing Chicago & A.R.R. v. Springfield & N.W. R.R., 67 111. 142, 145-46
(1873) (stating "[W]here the witness is an expert ... it is not competent to ask the opinion
of witnesses in such a way as to have it cover the very question to be found by the jury"),
and citing Lincoln v. Saratoga & S. R.R., 23 Wend. 425, 432 (N.Y. 1840) (stating
"[olpinions, belief deductions from facts, and such like, are matters which ... belong to
the jury and by which they arrive at their verdict. ) (emphasis in original)).
25Id.




30See generally FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note (stating "[the] older cases
often contained strictures against allowing witnesses to express opinions upon ultimate
issues, as a particular aspect of the rule against opinions. The rule was unduly restrictive,
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The true test of the admissibility of [expert] testimony is not whether
the subject matter is common or uncommon, or whether many persons
or few have some knowledge of the matter but it is whether the
witnesses offered as experts have any peculiar knowledge or expertise,
not common to the world, which renders their opinions founded on
such knowledge or experience any aid to the Court or the jury in
determining the questions at issue.
Similarly, a rethinking of the common law's ultimate issue rule led to the
conclusion that the restriction was unnecessary since it did not invade thejury's
province. 32 The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence thus specifically
rejected the common law ultimate issue rule in Federal Rule of Evidence
704(a).33 Further, the hypothetical question and the requirement of prior
disclosure of an expert's basis of opinion were criticized as confusing, subject
to abuse, and at odds with a search for the truth.34 The prior disclosure
requirement came to be seen as unnecessary and time-consuming because
cross-examination provides ample opportunity for the exploration of an
expert's basis. 35 Wigmore commented on the hypothetical question as
"misused by the clumsy and abused by the clever, [leading] to intolerable
obstruction of truth."3 6 Today, Federal Rule of Evidence 705 does not require
prior disclosure of the expert's basis of opinion in court; nor does it require a
party to use hypothetical questions to elicit an expert's opinion.3 7
Thus, Rules 704 and 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence do not present
courts or commentators with much difficulty today. Each rule represents
317 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1923, at 31-32 (Chadboum rev.
1978); see also Ladd, supra note 3, at 418 (stating that the test for finding the use of expert
testimony permissible is whether a layperson could determine the particular issue
intelligently).
3 2Graham, supra note 21, at 49 (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMIcK ON
EVIDENCE § 12, at 31 (3d ed. 1984)). "This change in viewpoint concerning ultimate fact
opinion resulted from the fact that the rule excluding opinion on ultimate facts is unduly
restrictive... [and] can often unfairly obstruct the presentation of a party's case....
Id.
33 FED. R. EVID. 704(a) states: "Except as provided in subsection (b), testimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Id.; see also FED. R. EVID.
704 advisory committee's note (stating that the basis usually assigned for the ultimate
issue rule is to prevent the witness from "usurping the province of the jury," and is aptly
characterized as "empty rhetoric.").
34 Graham, supra note 21, at 59-60.
35See FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's notes.
367 JoHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 686, at 962 (Chadboum rev. 1978).
3 7
"The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or
data on cross-examination." FED. R. EVID. 705.
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widely accepted standards regarding the form and substance of an expert's
opinion, and abolishes common law restrictions which have limited
applicability to the complexities of contemporary litigation. However, much
more complex issues arise regarding the threshold requirements for the
admissibility of scientific expert evidence. Lying at the heart of the battle is the
common law requirement, announced in 1923 by the D.C. Circuit in Frye v.
United States38, that an expert's opinion must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community in order to enter
the courtroom.
B. Frye v. United States and the General Acceptance Standard
Frye involved a criminal conviction for second degree murder in which the
defendant attempted to prove his innocence through the introduction of the
results of a "systolic blood pressure deception test."39 Counsel for the defendant
offered an expert witness to testify that, when examined, the defendant
truthfully denied involvement in the crime for which he was charged.40 The
trial court sustained the government's objection to the evidence and refused
the defendant's request to be tested in front of the jury.41 On appeal, the sole
assignment of error was the exclusion of the evidence, and the defendant
argued that the weight and credibility of the evidence was a question for the
jury, not the trial judge.42
In its opinion, the appellate court rejected the established common law
approach to admissibility of expert testimony and fashioned a sweeping new
38293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
39 d. The "systolic blood pressure deception test" is an ancestor of the polygraph,
commonly referred to as the "lie detector" test. The test was designed to show a




42The case was one of first impression in the United States, and in their brief, counsel
for the defendant argued the broad common law principle that expert evidence which
is outside the common knowledge and experience of the ordinary layperson is
admissible:
The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are admis-
sible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such
that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming
a correct judgment upon it, for the reason that the subject-matter so far
partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous habit or
experience or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it. When
the question involved does not lie within the range of common experi-
ence or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special
knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular
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rule to guide future courts in the determination of admissibility of novel
scientific evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
4 3
Noting that the systolic blood pressure deception test had not gained general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community,44 the court held that the
exclusion of the evidence was not error and affirmed the conviction. 45
The Frye test, recognized by courts across the country4 6, dominated the
judicial approach to controversial scientific evidence by the 1970s.47 Its
justification rests on a number of theories. First, proponents argue that the test
assures that "a minimal reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the
validity of a scientific determination in a particular case. "48 Second, because
the standard requires acceptance by the "scientific community," those best
qualified to determine what types of evidence are "acceptable" will resolve such
43 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
44
"We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities
as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far made." Id.
4 51d.
46 See, e.g., Scales v. City Court, 594 P.2d 97,100 (Ariz. 1979); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d
1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 633 (D.C. 1979);
Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 1968); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md.
1978); People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 172 (Mich. 1977); State v. LaForest 207 A.2d
429,430-31 (N.H. 1965); City of East Cleveland v. Ferell 154 N.E.2d 630,632 (Ohio 1958);
Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 1977); State v. Helmer, 278 N.W.2d
808,812 (S.D. 1979); State v. Canaday, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (Wash. 1978); State v. Frazier,
252 S.E.2d 39, 43 (W. Va. 1979).
4 7 Giannelli, supra note 3, at 1205 (citing Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978)
(stating "I t]his criterion of 'general acceptance' in the scientific community has come to
be the standard in almost all of the courts in the country which have considered the
question of the admissibility of scientific evidence.")).
4 8 See Note, supra note 3, at 859 (citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding inadmissible spectrographic voice identification which was
not generally accepted)); see also Graham, supra note 21, at 53.
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disputes. 49 Third, the standard promotes uniformity in judicial decisions by
requiring courts to rely on national pronouncements of scientific agreement.50
Fourth, the standard "protects the jury from the 'unwarranted impact caused
by the misleading aura of certainty that frequently surrounds new
discoveries.'" 51 Fifth, an appellate decision accepting a scientific development
would establish precedent binding in subsequent trials until the "relevant
scientific community" accepts the evidence as reliable. 52 Finally, at least one
commentator has argued what "junk science" critics have used as their
cornerstone argument: that the Frye test seeks "prevention of the introduction
into evidence of specious and unfounded scientific principles or conclusions
based upon such principles."53
The rationale espoused in defense of Frye has been accepted as theoretically
sound;54 however, a closer look at its practical limitations led many courts and
commentators to abandon the standard in the 1970s. 55 Dean McCormick
catalyzed the attack on the Frye rule in the first edition of his leading
hornbook,56 characterizing the standard as "a proper condition upon the
court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the
admissibility of scientific evidence. "57
Specific attacks on the Frye rule centered on at least five major criticisms.58
First, a difficulty in distinguishing "scientific" from other types of evidence led
to selective application of Frye, which in turn created widespread inconsis-
49 Note, supra note 3, at 859.
501d.
511d. (citing Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to
Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 883 (1982)).
52 McCormick, supra note 51, at 883.
53Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, U. ILL. L. F. 1, 14
(1970); see also Gass, Using the Frye Rule to Control Expert Testimony Abuses, 31 FOR THE
DEF. 23,24 (No. 2 1989) (stating that "[w]hile a certain amount of error must be tolerated
in a legal system composed of fallible human beings, erroneous legal judgments
founded on erroneous scientific theories will ultimately erode the respect and obedience
necessary for the legal system to function.").
54Note, supra note 3, at 860.
55Three cases illustrate the high water mark of the Frye standard: United States v.
Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976); Reed
v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978). For an excellent discussion of the decline of judicial
adherence to the Frye standard following these cases, see McCormick, supra note 51, at
883-905.
56See CHARLES T. McCORMIcK, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 171,363 (1954).
571d.
58See Note, supra note 3, at 860-62.
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tencies in its use in American courts.5 9 Second, defining the "relevant scientific
field" led to similar inconsistent results.60 Third, the phrase "general
acceptance" has been criticized as vague and ambiguous. 61 Fourth, because
Frye forces the court to focus on the "general acceptance" of a particular
scientific technique, critical problems in the use of the disputed evidence are
overshadowed. 62 For example, one writer has illustrated this criticism with
cases addressing the admissibility of paraffin tests, used to determine whether
an individual had fired a firearm. 63 By focusing on whether such tests were
"generally accepted," courts often overlooked critical problems with the test
such as "that the test was specific for [positive indications] of nitrates and
nitrites, but not necessarily for gunshot residues."64 Fifth, and most
importantly, Frye has been condemned for frustrating the search for the truth
by banning valuable and reliable scientific evidence from the courtroom.65 It
is this critical point that has led the battle for the rejection of Frye. The Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Bailer6 6 addressed this criticism in a case holding that
the introduction into evidence of voice spectrogram analysis 67 was not error:
Deciding whether [the Frye test has] been met is normally within the
discretion of the trial judge. Absolute certainty of result or unanimity
of scientific opinion is not required for admissibility. 'Every useful new
development must have its first day in court. And court records are
full of the conflicting opinions of doctors, engineers, and accountants,
to name just a few of the legions of expert witnesses.' Unless an
591d. at 860 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific
Evidence-A Prinieron Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARYL. REV.
261,264-65 (1981-82); State v. Hall, 297 N.W. 2d 80,85 (Iowa 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 927 (1981).
60Note, supra note 3, at 860 (citing Lmwinkelried, supra note 59, at 265) (asking
"[sihould forensic science itself be treated as a scientific field?"); see also Hall, 297 N.W.2d
at 85 (stating "[dlespite its apparent simplicity, distinguishing 'scientific' evidence from
other areas of expert testimony is a difficult determination in many instances.").
61Note, supra note 3, at 860.
6 2 See Giannelli, supra note 3, at 1226.
6 31d. at 1227.
6 41d.
6 SImwinkelried, supra note 3, at 265 (arguing "[t]he test ensures that the courts will
constantly lag behind the advances of science while the courts wait for novel scientific
techniques to win 'general acceptance."').
66519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975).
6 7 Voice spectrogram analysis, commonly referred to as "voiceprints" are used as a
method to determine a speaker's identity. The spectrograph reduces the spoken word
to a pattern of light and, when printed, show a pattern of dark lines representing
frequency, duration, and amplitude. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique
makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to
admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert
testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination
and refutation.
68
Many other courts took a similar view, but it was the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975 which hastened the abandonment of Frye.
C. Expert Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence
Many of the hurdles that the common law placed in front of expert witnesses
were removed by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. As
previously noted, the Rules abolished the hypothetical question requirement
and now allow the expert to embrace the ultimate issue of a case.69 Moreover,
unlike the common law, the Rules do not mandate that expert evidence be
based on knowledge or experience uncommon to lay persons. 70 These common
law rules have been supplanted by Federal Rules of Evidence 704 and 705.71
Further liberalizing common law restrictions on experts are Rules 702 and 703,
the vanguard Federal Rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony.72
Under Rule 702, a trial judge's preliminary concern is whether the proffered
expert is qualified to testify. At common law, a proposed expert would not be
allowed to testify unless the trial judge was convinced of the expert's
qualifications. 73 Rule 702 maintains this requirement. Under the Rule, an expert
may be qualified within the Rule if she possesses knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education which relates directly to the complexity of the subject
matter to which she will testify.74 The degree of knowledge or experience
required in order to qualify one as an expert is solely within the discretion of
68519 F.2d at 466 (citations omitted).
6 9 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
7OSee supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
72Initially, it must be noted that under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) the trial judge
has the discretion to decide preliminary questions, such as the admissibility of expert
testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides, in relevant part: "Preliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ... or the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court." FED. R. EvID. 104(a). Such determinations
are, of course, conducted out of the hearing of the jury in most cases. See FED. R. EVID.
104(c).
73 See Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 774, 782 (1980).
74 FED. R. EVID. 702.
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the trial judge; and the trial court will not require the proposed expert to satisfy
an "overly narrow test" of his or her own qualifications.75
An often overlooked aspect of Rule 702 is that it does not limit expert
testimony to that which is "scientific" or "technical." Rather, the Rule
encompasses those persons who possess "specialized" knowledge. Thus,
various individuals, referred to as "skilled" witnesses may fall within the scope
of the Rule. Typical examples of "skilled" witnesses include bankers and
landowners testifying to land values.76
After the judge has answered the qualification issue in the affirmative, she
must determine whether the expert's testimony will assist the trier to
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. 77 Under the Rule, the trial
court determines the admissibility of expert testimony solely on the basis of its
helpfulness to the fact-finder. To be helpful, the subject of the testimony must
be within the expert's field and the foundation for the opinion must intelligibly
relate the testimony to the facts.78 Because of the flexibility of the Rule and the
liberal approach to the admissibility of evidence taken by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, testimony which is borderline helpful is generally admitted. 79
Next, the trial judge must consider the basis of the proposed expert's
testimony under Rule 703.80 The Rule was adopted in order to facilitate judicial
efficiency by not requiring an attorney to produce and examine several
authenticating witnesses.8 1 Under Rule 703, an expert may base an opinion on
facts known to her, ascertained through study or practice. For example, a
75 See Duff v. Page, 249 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Gardner v. General Motors
Corp., 507 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1974).
76 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes; see also Robinson v. Watts Detective
Agency, 685 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding the owner of a business competent to give
his opinion as to the value of his property); Kastenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 514
F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975) (permitting landowner's opinion on the value of his property).
Experienced truckers and long-time employee's of an industry provide additional
examples. See, e.g., Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977) (allowing a person
in the trucking business with thirty years experience to testify on proper design of
suspension systems for trucks); Panger v. Duluth, Winnipeg & Pac. Ry., 490 F.2d 1112
(8th Cir. 1974) (permitting an employee injured in an industrial accident to testify based
upon his experience with industry as to how the employer could have avoided the
accident).
77 FED. R. EVID. 702.
78 McCormick, supra note 51, at 881.
79 See, e.g., In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223,1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
80The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or known to [him] at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EviD. 703.
81FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's notes.
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physician who testifies may base her opinion on statements from patients,
reports and opinions from nurses and other physicians, hospital records, and
X-rays.82 Moreover, if the facts upon which the expert will rely are not
themselves admissible in evidence, the Rule gives the trial judge discretion in
disallowing an expert's opinion if other experts in the relevant field do not rely
upon them as well. 83 For example, if an opinion is based upon an unsupported
theory or on facts that other experts would feel insufficient to warrant reliance,
the judge may exclude it.84 The test for determining the admissibility of an
opinion based on facts reasonably relied on by other experts in the field is not
satisfied simply by a showing that other experts would rely on the data for
purposes of litigation; rather, the attorney proposing a contested expert must
show that other experts would rely on the same facts in a non-litigation
context. 85
Even if the trial judge determines that a proposed expert satisfies these
requirements, the inquiry is not at an end. An expert may still be excluded from
testifying if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
prejudice, time considerations, or confusion of the jury.86 In making a ruling
based on Rule 403, the trial judge engages in a balancing test which considers
the probative value of the evidence against the harm likely to result from its
admission.87 The purpose of Rule 403 is to exclude relevant evidence which
has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, such as
emotionalism.8 8
III. CHICKEN LITTLE "FRYES" SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
STRICT SCRUTINY
Although there has been much discussion to the effect that the general
acceptance standard in Frye v. United States has been abandoned in many
jurisdictions as a result of the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
821d.; see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 277 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. granted on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1002 (1985), rev'd and renanded sub. non.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Rule 703 has been
construed broadly by the federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Baca, 687 F.2d 1356,
1361 (10th Cir. 1982) (an expert could give an opinion as to defendant's competence
based on another doctor's evaluations).
8 3 FED. R. EVID. 703.
84See Note, supra note 73, at 783.
8 51d.
8 6Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EViD. 403.
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1975,89 a closer look at the modem trend toward skepticism of plaintiffs'
experts reveals that this is simply not the case.90 Many courts have now
embarked on a trend which purports to apply Frye, a criminal case, in civil toxic
tort litigation. It is this critical distinction which has received too little attention
from courts and commentators. Although it has been suggested that the Frye
standard should persevere in criminal cases as an extra protection for
defendants battling the powers of the State,91 it is less clear whether the use of
Frye, in any form, is a good idea in the civil context.
The typical situation in which the strict scrutiny idea flourishes is the
so-called toxic tort in which the plaintiff alleges harm was done as a result of
exposure to toxic chemicals. Because of the difficulties in linking exposure of
toxic chemicals to human harm, causation, via the expert opinion, is often the
decisive factor in such cases.92 The strict scrutiny approach, or active review,
is an attempt to ensure that a plaintiff's scientific experts testify within the
mainstream of scientific knowledge by empowering the trial judge to reject
claims of causation which seemingly do not reflect widely adopted theories.
93
Perhaps the first recent court to take active judicial control of scientific
testimony was the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in
the well-known In Re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation.94 In this
class-action suit, Vietnam veterans and their families sued a number of
chemical companies which manufactured an herbicide designed for
defoliation of the Vietnam jungles.95 The plaintiffs sought compensation for
various diseases allegedly caused as a result of their exposure to dioxin.96
In support of their claims, plaintiffs sought to enter into evidence proof of
causation by extrapolating through epidemiological studies97 and animal tests
89 See generally Giannelli, supra note 3; Graham, supra note 21; McCormick, supra note
51; Note, supra note 3.
90 See Bell, supra note 5, at 50. 'The modem version of the Frye rule finds its
dangerously amorphous equivalent in the most prevalent version of the strict scrutiny
idea: the concept of active review." Id.
9 1 See Giannelli, supra note 3, at 1245-50.
92 See SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 8-9. "In the traditional tort case, the nature of the injury
is typically straightforward .... In the toxic tort dispute, the nature of the injury is very
different and the processes of establishing, defining, and measuring the injury are far
more complex .... Often the pathways of causation are difficult to detect .... I d.
93 See Gass, supra note 53; Bert Black, Evolving Legal Standards for the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence, 239 ScI. 1508 (1988).
94611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
9 51d. at 1228.
96 1d. at 1229.
9 7Epidemiological studies rely on "statistical methods to detect abnormally high
incidences of disease in a study population and to associate these incidences with
unusual exposures to suspect environmental factors." Michael Dore, A Commentary on
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a trend that showed "to a reasonable degree of medical probability" exposure
to dioxin was the source of their ailments. 98 The defense argued that they were
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs failed
to "present credible evidence of a causal link between exposure to Agent
Orange and the various diseases from which they are suffering."99 In granting
the motion for summary judgement, Judge Weinstein sounded the trumpet for
active review by stating that "[w]hen either the expert's qualifications or his
testimony lie at the periphery of what the scientific community considers
acceptable, special care should be exercised in evaluating the reliability and
probative worth of the proffered testimony."100
Perhaps the best illustration of the development of strict scrutiny following
Agent Orange can be found through a study of Fifth Circuit precedent since
1986. The first call to active review was sounded in In Re Air Crash Disaster at
New Orleans.10 1 In this case, the surviving children of parents who were killed
in a Pan American airplane crash sued the airline for wrongful death.102 The
jury awarded the children a total of $4,700,000 and an award of $100,000 each
for loss of inheritance.103 On appeal, the court reversed the award of loss of
inheritance on the grounds that plaintiffs' economist's testimony was "so
abusive of the known facts, and so removed from any area of demonstrated
expertise, as to provide no reasonable basis for calculating how much of [the
decedent's] income would ... be inherited by his children."104
The criticism, however, should not be focused on the court's reasoning for
overturning the loss of inheritance verdict. Indeed, the court-an appellate
court charged with the duty of reviewing such decisions-devoted two pages
to criticizing the erroneous assumptions of the plaintiffs' economist. 105 Rather,
the criticism is directed toward the "message [sent] to [their] able trial
colleagues: it is time to take hold of expert testimony in federal trials."10 6 To
be sure, it is of the utmost importance to scrutinize "experts" who will testify
as to critical issues in a case in order to assure trustworthiness. However, when
taken to its logical extreme, this vigorous attitude toward experts whose
qualifications are beyond dispute tends to "further entrench[] our legal
the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENvTL L. REV.
429, 431 (1983).
98611 F. Supp. at 1237-38.
9 9 d. at 1229.
1001d. at 1242.
101795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986).
102 d. at 1231.
1031d. at 1232.
104 d. at 1235.
10 5 d. at 1234-35.
106795 F.2d at 1234.
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system's bias towards not imposing liability upon defendants whose toxic
substances in fact have caused injuries."107
The Fifth Circuit continued its call for active review in more blatant terms
when it held that defendants were entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.108 This case was one of the many
filed against Merrell Dow by parents of children with birth defects allegedly
caused by the ingestion of Bendectin1 09 during pregnancy.110 In this case, as
with all Bendectin cases, plaintiffs sought to prove causation through
epidemiological evidence.111 The plaintiffs obtained a jury verdict in the
amount of $550,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.112 In holding that
the epidemiological evidence which the trial judge allowed the jury to hear was
not conclusive, 113 the court stated: "[h]opefully our decision will have the
effect of encouraging district judges faced with medical and epidemiological
proof in subsequent toxic tort cases to be especially vigilant in scrutinizing the
basis, reasoning, and conclusiveness of studies presented by both sides."
114
The Fifth Circuit then denied the plaintiffs' petition for rehearing en banc over
the spirited dissent of six judges.115 Noting that "six highly qualified and
experienced experts testified that Bendectin is... capable of causing human
107 Bell, supra note 5, at 79.
108874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
1046 (1990).
109 Bendectin, a drug marketed and sold by Merrell-Dow, has been prescribed to
thousands of women to combat "morning sickness" during pregnancy. It was first
approved for sale in 1956 by the Food and Drug Administration and public concern
about its relationship to birth defects mounted in the 1970's. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell
Nat'l Labs, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
11OBrock, 874 F.2d at 309.
111Id. at 308.
1121d.
113 The plaintiffs relied on re-analysis results, conducted as the '1-leinonen study"
under the auspices of the U.S. National Institute of Neurological and Communicative
Disorders which was based on over 50,000 pregnancy records collected in the United
States. The study revealed that of 1,000 women who took Bendectin during the first
trimester, 63 had infants born with malformations as opposed to 3,200 of 49,000 who
had not taken Bendectin. This yielded a relative risk (a number used to describe the
increased incidence of birth defects in those who took Bendectin as opposed to those
who did not) of .97. A relative risk of 1.0 or greater means that there were more birth
defects in the women who took Bendectin. On appeal, the court held that the .97 relative
risk was not conclusive evidence in showing a causal link between ingestion of
Bendectin and resulting birth defects. Id. at 312.
1141d. at 315.
115 Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989).
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birth defects," the dissenters attacked the reversal of the jury verdict for
circumventing the Federal Rules of Evidence.11 6 The dissent asks rhetorically:
"[iun the absence of expert consensus must we now always await population
studies before a jury verdict may be based on medical opinion?"11 7
The battle on the Fifth Circuit came to a climax two years later in the classic
toxic tort setting of Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp.118 In stark contrast to
Brock, the Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc11 9 after the appellate panel
upbraided the trial judge for granting a defense motion for summary
judgment.12 0 Remarkably, on rehearing the Fifth Circuit reversed the appellate
panel and affirmed the original granting of the defense motion for summary
judgment.12 1
Albert Christopherson was exposed to defendant's nickel and cadmium
fumes for fourteen years at his workplace, a battery manufacturing plant.12 2
He died in 1986 from a rare form of colon cancer that metastasized to his liver.12 3
Believing that the exposure caused Albert's death, his surviving wife and
children subsequently brought a wrongful death suit against those entities
allegedly responsible. 124
The en banc decision, while claiming that its approach introduced "no new
concepts to our jurisprudence,"125 based its decision on a combination of Rule
703 and Frye v. United States.126 The opinion proceeded through a reading of
1161d. at 168. Indeed, the panel decision did not cite a single Federal Rule of Evidence
in support of its rationale.
1171d.
118939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991).
119Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 914 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1990).
120Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1990). The panel
concluded that the trial court had excluded plaintiff's expert solely because it found the
expert's opinion to be unreliable as a whole. The panel said that any questions about
the adequacy of an opinion based on the exposure information provided to plaintiff's
expert should be raised at trial to assist the jury in determining the weight and credibility
of his conclusion. Moreover, the panel noted that the dismissal was based on affidavits
of four defense experts who, without being subject to any cross-examination, concluded
that plaintiff's expert's conclusions had no support in medical science. The panel
acknowledged that some of the defense affidavits posed a direct conflict with the
plaintiff's expert, but pointed out that they simply raised the sort of conflicting opinion
which the trial process was supposed to permit a jury to resolve, and the trial judge
"simply chose sides in this battle of the experts and thereby usurped the role of the jury."
Id.




125Id. at 1120 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
126939 F.2d at 1109.
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Frye into Rule 703, resulting in the requirement that an expert's opinion or
methodology be reasonably reliable.127 The court concluded that the plaintiff's
expert opinion was not reasonably reliable because the expert based his
opinion, in part, on information received by one of Mr. Christopherson's fellow
employees regarding the amount of toxic exposure on the job.128 In revitalizing
and citing Frye,129 the court held that the expert was properly excluded because
two defense experts testified in affidavits that they rejected plaintiff's expert's
reasoning and methodology.130
In a riveting dissent, four judges attacked the majority for "'tak[ing] hold' of
expert testimony by taking over."131 The dissent pointed out that Rule 703 is
satisfied once there is a showing that an expert's testimony is based on the type
of data a reasonable expert in the field would use in rendering an opinion on
the subject at issue; the Rule "does not address the reliability or general
acceptance of an expert's methodology."132 Moreover, the dissent criticized the
majority's use of Frye which goes far beyond its pre-1975 confines. The court
noted that the Fifth Circuit had previously "only once employed Frye outside
the criminal context, never applied it to 'reasoning,' and indeed once expressly
limited the Frye doctrine to 'pseudo-scientific data."' 133
In a separate dissent, one judge questioned the motives behind the per
curiam opinion, succinctly illustrating the debate over so-called "junk science":
Lest anyone misunderstand, at root this is not a case about the
Federal Rules of Evidence, albeit that two of them have been mangled
in the process. It is instead about the outcomes in toxic tort cases. What
the majority is saying is that in its view, the outcomes in toxic tort cases
12 71d. at 1114. The court stated: "[Dlistrict judges may reject opinions founded on
critical facts that are plainly untrustworthy, principally because such an opinion cannot




131939 F.2d at 1122. The dissent finishes the paragraph by stating:
The per curiam opinion effectively allows judges to decide the reli-
ability, weight, and relative merit of expert opinions, at least in toxic
tort cases. And with such control, we signal a willingness to increase
the proof and persuasion burdens of the disfavored party .... Surely
my colleagues ... should know that their use of these concepts confuses
the admissibility of evidence with the sufficiency of evidence, changes
the Rules of Evidence without benefit of amendment, denies Mrs.
Christopherson her right to trial by jury, and eliminates substantive rights
in tort cases where federal courts have only diversity jurisdiction.
Id. (Reavley, J., dissenting).
1321d. at 1129 n.30 (quoting DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d
941, 953 (3d Cir. 1990)).
1331d. at 1133.
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that have been left to the jury have too often been unacceptable. The
majority's solution is to re-write the Federal Rules of Evidence...
which, implicitly, have too often been misapplied by "our able trial
colleagues.".. . Plaintiffs attempting to establish liability in areas in
which scientific methodology or reasoning is not yet well-established
will face a nearly insurmountable burden. The result will be to deprive
plaintiffs with possibly meritorious claims of a jury's assessment of
their right to recovery.
The strict scrutiny approach exemplified by the Fifth Circuit is just one in an
increasing number of jurisdictions. Modem toxic tort litigation presents novel,
challenging problems for the federal judiciary. Nevertheless, the dangers of a
court's wading into scientific issues with this "especially vigilant" attitude are
coming to the fore. Active review clearly signals that courts are readily
accepting the "junk science" position that plaintiffs are attempting to prove
causation with "methods as bizarre as tarot cards and ouija boards."135 The
Federal Rules of Evidence quite clearly allow a court to exclude such patently
unreliable testimony.136 But testimony which is merely controversial,
debatable, questionable, unsettled or suspicious should be given only as much
weight and credibility as a jury will allow.13 7 Judges are now invited to weigh
the credibility of witnesses, determine the merits of testimonial evidence, and
exclude plaintiff's proof of causation if defendants can produce more experts138
to disagree-in an affidavit-as to the degree of "acceptance" of an unusual or
uncertain methodology.139 As courts strain to read the Frye doctrine into
134Id. at 1136-37.
13 5Michael Ciresi, Protecting Your Evidence Against 'Junk Science' Attacks, TRIAL, Nov.
1991, at 35.
13 6See Christophwrson, 939 F.2d at 1127 (Reavley, J. dissenting).
The language expressing such patent unreliability varies, but never
signals testimony or assumptions that are merely controversial,
debatable, questionable, unsettled, or suspicious. These terms connote
weight and credibility. Instead, courts speak of testimony that is 'almost
entirely unreliable,' reliance upon 'assumptions devoid of any basis in
the real world,' opinions that are 'abusive of the known facts' or 'contrary
to the proven facts,' or so manifestly wrong as to offend common sense.'
Id. (citations omitted).
13 7See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 956 (3d Cir.
1990) (explaining that the Federal Rules of Evidence embody a strong and undeniable
preference for admitting any evidence having some potential for assisting the trier of
fact and for dealing with the risk of error through the adversarial process).
138 Even more shocking, the trial court's decision might rest on the affidavit of a single
expert, versus numerous plaintiff's experts, as it did in Daubert. See infra notes 153-63
and accompanying text.
13 9Christopherson was decided within one year of its filing by the unusual method of
summary judgment. The dissent lamented that "The causation issue is not sufficiently
investigated to warrant summary proceedings based on direct judicial precedent or
judicial acknowledgement of decisive negative findings.
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particular evidentiary rules, courthouse doors are being slammed on plaintiffs
while the bench continues to erode the proposition that "relevant, unprivileged
evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the fact-finder, who would
have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing
party."140
The U.S. Supreme Court entered the debate 14 1 to attempt to settle the issue
by deciding a Bendectin case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.142 As
with other Bendectin cases specifically, and toxic tort cases in general, both
sides in the Daubert dispute were armed with highly qualified, reputable
scientific experts. Employing the strict scrutiny approach adopted in three
other Bendectin cases,143 the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Merrell Dow.144 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that decision,
citing Peter Huber's latest assault on the tort system, Galileo's Revenge: Junk
Science in the Courtroom,145 as persuasive.146 The Supreme Court is urged to
adopt the following analysis of the issues presented before it. A contrary
decision will confirm a failure "to set our faces firmly against these cries of wolf,
[and] we will find the adversary system destroyed and replaced by an
inquisitorial system of review by panels of experts drawn from the reigning
establishments." 147
No clearly established facts in the record controvert the scientific facts [of plaintiff's
expert's] reasoning .... With its deference to summary rendering of Christopherson, the
majority endows judges with the work of juries." 939 F.2d at 1127-29.
140 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983).
14 1 See supra note 15.
142951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992), and vacated, 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993).
143 See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989);
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Lynch v. Merrell
Nat'l Labs, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
144 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
afl'd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992), and vacated, 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993).
1 4 5 See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 4.
146 Daubcrt, 951 F.2d at 1131.
147George W. Conk, Free Marketeers Assail Free Market of Ideas, 129 N.J. L.J. Index Page
779 (Nov. 14,1991). Peer review of scientific opinions and methodologies is an approach
advocated by strict scrutinists, adopted by the Ninth Circuit and an issue before the
Supreme Court in Daubert. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 4, at 228 (stating
that the best test of certainty we have is good science-the science of publication,
replication, and verification, the science of consensus and peer review).
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IV. CHICKEN LITTLE GOES TO THE SUPREME COURT: DAUBERT V. MERRELL Dow
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller were born with severe and
permanent limb-reduction birth defects. 148 They and their parents brought
suits in California state court alleging that the birth defects were caused by their
mothers' ingestion of Bendectin during the first trimester of their pregnancy.149
The defendants invoked the diversity jurisdiction of the federal district court
and had the cases removed. 150 Following discovery, the defendants moved for
summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs could not offer admissible
evidence to prove their allegations.151 That motion was granted by the district
court, stating that the "necessary predicate to the admission of scientific
evidence is that the principle upon which it is based 'must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the field to which it
belongs.'" 152
The plaintiffs employed eight expert witnesses, all of whom have
outstanding credentials, and hold important positions in their fields.153 Each
expert concluded that Bendectin is a human teratogen154 and that when
ingested during pregnancy, is capable of producing limb defects in human
fetuses.155 One expert further concluded, based on the teratogenic properties
of Bendectin, the timing of its ingestion by plaintiffs' mothers, and the lack of
any medical factors in their mothers' backgrounds that might explain the
defects, that Bendectin in fact caused the malformities.156 The experts based
14 8 Daubert, 951 F.2d 1128.
14 91d.
150 Brief for Petitioners at 2, Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d
1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992), and vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
151Id. The defense motion did not contest whether the plaintiff's mothers had ingested
Bendectin, nor did the motion suggest the possibility that the birth defects were caused
by anything else, including genetic factors. Id.
152 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570,570 (S.D. Cal. 1989)
(citing United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992), and vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). While
the district court did not cite Frye, the Kilgus opinion from which it quoted the rule cites
Frye as its source.
153 Brief for Petitioners at 3, Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d
1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992), and vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
154 A teratogenic agent is any substance which causes fetal malformations "or
monstrosities." WEBSTER'S ]] NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 1194 (1984).
155Brief for Petitioners at 4, Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d
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their conclusions, with respect to causation, upon an analysis of four sources,
"in vivo" animal studies, 157 "in vitro" studies of animal cells, 158
pharmacological studies, 159 and epidemiological studies.160 The experts'
affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs in opposition to the defense motion for
summary judgment recited that these four sources of information are the
standard sources generally consulted by scientists when attempting to form
opinions about whether a substance causes birth defects. 161 Moreover, the
plaintiffs also submitted the testimony of several experts, called by Merrell
Dow in other Bendectin litigation, agreeing that conclusions respecting
causation are customarily predicated upon the results of all four of these
sources.
162
The defendants, in support of their motion for summary judgment,
submitted a two page affidavit of a single expert. That affidavit merely stated
that the expert had reviewed all of the Bendectin and human birth defect
literature and concluded that the maternal use of Bendectin during the first
trimester of pregnancy is not a risk factor for human birth defects. 163 It was on
the basis of this record that the trial court ruled plaintiffs' expert testimony
inadmissible.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a scenario more ripe for adversarial,
as opposed to unilateral, judicial, adjudication. As any first-year law student
knows, the burden of persuasion in the civil tort context is typically based on
"a preponderance of the evidence" standard or, more simply, that a defendant's
negligence was "more likely than not" the cause of a plaintiff's injuries.16 4 In
157
"In vivo" animal studies compare the offspring of animals subjected to dosages of
Bendectin during pregnancy with the offspring of those not subjected to Bendectin.
158
"In vitro" studies examine animal cells exposed to Bendectin, to determine whether
abnormal cell development associated with human limb birth defects results.
159Pharmacological studies examine the chemical structure of Bendectin and compare
that structure with the structures of other similar substances known to ca use comparable
birth defects in humans.
16 OThese particular epidemiological studies compile data gathered in studies
comparing the incidence of birth defects of various types in the offspring of women who
took Bendectin during pregnancy with those of women who did not.
16 1Brief for Petitioners at 4-5, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d
1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992), and vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
162Id.
1631d. at 2.
164 See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1182 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining "preponderance of
evidence" as "standard of proof in civil cases ... which as a whole shows that the fact
sought to be proved is more probable than not"); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (stating that preliminary questions, such as admissibility of
evidence, are required to "be established by a preponderance of proof."); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY at 161 (defining "beyond a reasonable doubt" as standard in evidence, used
in criminal cases, meaning "fully satisfied, entirely convinced, satisfied to a moral
certainty.").
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addition, a court determines summary judgment by construing the evidence
"in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."165 The Dauberts, it
seems, were not afforded the benefit of either of these propositions which are
an intrinsic part of the legal package which ensures a fair trial, and moreover,
a trial by jury. Active review, or strict judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence not
only defies common sense, but conveniently ignores long-standing and basic
tenets of American jurisprudence. To continue encouraging judges to place
scientific testimony under a powerful microscope during the pretrial stages of
litigation ensures that plaintiffs in the future will face an insurmountable
burden when trying to prove their injuries.
B. Burning the Frye Standard
The United States Supreme Court, in Bourjaily v. United States166 considered
the status of the so-called "bootstrapping rule" under the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule.167 In that case, the petitioner argued that the
bootstrapping rule, as construed by several courts of appeals, survived the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.168 The Court rejected the
argument, finding that "[i]t would be extraordinary to require legislative
history to confirm the plain meaning of Rule 104."169 Thus, because Congress
did not include the common law bootstrapping rule in any of the codified
hearsay exceptions, 170 the plain meaning of Rule 104171 mandated the
conclusion that hearsay statements themselves were not barred to prove
conspiracy and trigger the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. 172
165 See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d at 941, 945
(1990)("Summary judgment is appropriate when, after considering the record evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.") (emphasis added).
166483 U.S. 171 (1987).
16 7The "bootstrapping rule"-firmly embraced by the United States Supreme Court
itself prior to the Rules' enactment in 1975-had always barred hearsay statements
themselves from being used to prove conspiracy and thus to trigger the co-conspirator
exception to the prohibition on hearsay. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 177. In previous cases, the
Court had reasoned that without that rule, "'hearsay would lift itself up by its own
bootstraps to the level of competent evidence."' Id. (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942)).
168 Id. at 178.
1691d. (emphasis in original).
170See FED. R. EVID. 803-04 (hearsay exceptions).
17 1 See supra note 72.
172 A statement is not hearsay if... "[tihe statement is offered against a party and is
... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in the furtherance
of the conspiracy." FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(2)(E).
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Other decisions by the Supreme Court have rejected similar arguments for
skewed readings of the Federal Rules of Evidence.173
Beginning with the premise, as recognized by the United States Supreme
Court, that an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence must proceed
with the "plain meaning" of the Rules themselves, it logically follows that the
"general acceptance" standard of Frye v. United States cannot stand
independently of the Rules if Congress did not intend to preserve it therein. A
careful reading of the Federal Rules of Evidence, including its legislative
history, unmistakably reveals no such intention. Rule 402, "the keystone of the
whole scheme"174 states that"[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible." 175 Rule 402,
then, represents a desire "to wipe the slate clean"17 6 of all common law
exclusionary rules and mandate that "the rest of the Evidence Rules are
exceptions to the basic rule of relevance."177
No support can be found for an exclusionary doctrine regarding expert
opinions that are not "generally accepted" in any of the five Federal Rules
dealing with expert witnesses. A colorful argument has been made however,
that Rule 702 requires exclusion of scientific evidence that is not "generally
accepted" in the scientific community because it is not helpful to the trier of
fact.178 However, this is a fundamental misreading of the Rule. Nothing in the
Rule allows a judge to substitute his judgment as to the credibility of a witness
or the weight to be given the evidence over that of the jury. Moreover, an
argument to the effect that only "generally accepted" opinions are helpful to
the trier of fact is simply illogical. After all, "almost every generally accepted
view was once deemed eccentric or heretical."179
173 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992); Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); United
States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); see also Judge Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein,
The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning"
Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions
for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992).
1 7 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 5192, at 177 (1978) (quoting NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON
EVIDENCE, REPORT, at 10 (1953)).
175A11 relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible. FED. R. EviD. 402.
176WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 174, at 178.
1771d. at 177.
178See, e.g., United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th
Cir. 1987), affd in part on other grounds and remanded in part, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
179Bell, supra note 5, at 80.
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A second approach advocated for finding Frye in the Federal Rules of
Evidence rests in the language of Rule 703.180 The argument advanced is that
the phrase "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions" in Rule 703 incorporates Frye.181 However, Rule 703 was not
designed to restrict expert testimony; rather it was designed to broaden and
liberalize the permissible bases for expert testimony.182 Rule 703 states that "[ilf
[the facts or data upon which the expert relies are] of a type reasonably relied
upon... [they] . . .need not be admissible into evidence."183 Thus, the plain
language of the Rule does away with the common law requirement of
admitting into evidence the data upon which an expert relies in forming an
opinion, which would otherwise constitute hearsay.184 Thus, for example, the
experts offered by the plaintiffs in Daubert consulted the precise facts and data
that scientists generally rely upon in forming an opinion about whether birth
defects were caused by toxic substances.185 It is the conclusions reached from
those "facts and data" which are the source of controversy. A defense objection
to their choice of data base might trigger 703 analysis, yet the controversial
nature of the experts' conclusions therefrom do not. The Court should be
mindful that "the proper inquiry is not what the [trial] court deems reliable, but
what experts in the relevant field deem it to be."186
Furthermore, it is quite unlikely that requiring proposed experts'
conclusions on such issues to be published in a peer-reviewed journal would
add anything to the persuasiveness of the testimony.187 Indeed, weighing the
persuasiveness of testimony is a duty of the jury. Moreover, "the Federal Rules
of Evidence contain no requirement that an expert's testimony be based upon
reasoning subjected to peer review and published in the professional litera-
180 See supra note 80.
18 1See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir.
1989) (Reavley, J., dissenting).
182 See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 952-53 (3d Cir.
1990).
18 3 FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
184 5ee supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
18 5See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
18 61n re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 853 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting In re
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 961 (1991).
18 75ee Charles W. McCutchen, Peer Review: Treacherous Servant, Disastrous Master,
TECH. REV., Oct. 1990, at 28-33.
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ture."188 An expert's "'peer review' comes when experts called by the other
party... mount the witness stand. '189
Perhaps the most critical aspect of finding justification for the incorporation
of Frye into the Federal Rules of Evidence is that in so holding, the Supreme
Court would threaten an annihilation of diversity jurisprudence as announced
in the seminal case of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 19 0 and its progeny. Because the
Federal Rules of Evidence apply to diversity actions governed by state
substantive law, application of the Frye doctrine to causation issues in toxic tort
litigation would often be outcome-determinative. For example, in Oxendine v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.,191 the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld a jury
finding that Bendectin caused birth defects.192 If the Supreme Court finds that
Frye survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the next
case filed in the District of Columbia can (and undoubtedly will) be removed
to federal court and the same evidence found to be admissible by the D.C. Court
of Appeals would be inadmissible in the federal forum. Similarly, in Daubert, a
case that was removed from state to federal court, the causation evidence most
likely would have been admissible under California state law 193 and removal
to the federal court produced precisely this result.194
The only plausible method of incorporating Frye into the Federal Rules of
Evidence, then, is for Congress to actually do so-by passing an amendment
to one of the Rules governing the admissibility of scientific evidence. If the
Supreme Court adopts a view similar to that as presented herein, and reverses
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Daubert,19 5 then it becomes academic as
to whether the formerly proposed amendment to Rule 702 will reemerge in
Congressional debates. For such is surely to be the case. An amendment to Rule
702 will do nothing more than ensure that fewer plaintiffs are compensated for
their injuries. Despite the laudable concerns voiced by its proponents, adoption
of a proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 will represent
Chicken Little's ultimate form of revenge. For in the area of Rules formulation,
Congress has the final word.
188 DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1990).
189 Brief for Petitioners at 48, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d
1128 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992), and vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
190304 U.S. 64 (1938).
191506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990).
1921d. at 1110.
193 California is one of the states that adopted the Frye rule. See People v. Kelly, 549
P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976). However, its use has been limited solely to the original
context of Frye-criminal cases.
194Cf. Christopherson, 939 F.2d 1106, 1135-36 (5th Cir. 1991) (Reavley, J., dissenting)
(intimating that under Texas state law, the plaintiff undoubtedly "would have received
her jury trial and.., would have recovered [her] judgment.")
19 5See supra note 15.
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V. CHICKEN LITTLE GOES TO CONGRESS: AMENDING FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 702
Perhaps because those straining to read Frye into the Federal Rules of
Evidence can not justifiably do so, strict scrutinists have proposed a revision
of Rule 702 designed to enlarge district court power in excluding novel forms
of expert testimony. The former proposed amendment to Rule 702, which has
been withdrawn and postponed until after the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert, provided for the following changes:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If the courtfinds (1) that reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized
krtowledge-information will substantially assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue; and (2) that a
witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education to provide such assistance, it may permit the witness
to testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Except with
leave of court for good cause shown, the witness shall not testify on direct
examination in any civil action to any opinion or inference, or reason or basis
therefor, that has not been seasonably disclosed as required bil Rule 26(a) (2)
and Rule 26(e) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.196
Despite the advisory committee's disclaimer that "the amendment does not
mandate a return to the strictures of Frye,197" it is doubtful that such a radical
change would avoid such an effect. First, the insertion of the words "reliable"
and "substantially" represents an approach even more conservative than the
Frye standard itself. Requiring an explicit finding by the court that "reliable"
expert testimony will "substantially" assist the trier gives federal judges the
power to make their own assessments of the type of information that will be
helpful, rather than leaving that determination to what the scientific community
considers "generally accepted." Moreover, this phraseology metamorphoses
the judge into a quasi-jury by concentrating the determination of credibility
and weight to be given a witness in the hands of a single black-robed
individual. Such an approach will undoubtedly raise the threshold level of
discretionary abuse, and consequently, on appeal, plaintiffs will be fighting the
proverbial "losing battle." Furthermore, Judge Weinstein has voiced
displeasure with the requirement of a formal judicial finding on the record,
noting that the approach will "slow trials and provide an additional basis for
appeals and motion practice."198 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the use
of the word "may" together with "permit" represents a fool-proof mechanism
that allows the judge to throw an expert witness's testimony out even if the
other strict commands of the rule have been satisfied.
1 9 6 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note on proposed amendments (June 1991).
1 9 7 Id.
198 Weinstein, supra note 12, at 636.
[Vol. 41:717
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/5
1993] STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 745
Amending Rule 702 seems not only dangerous but also unnecessary. It is
dangerous because of the enormous substantive impact such a radical
approach will have on future litigation outcomes. The present era seems to be
witnessing a shift from so-called "plaintiff sympathy" to "Goliath
sympathy"-a displeasure associated with seeing resource abundant
industries transform seriously injured individuals into wealthy citizens. Thus,
as Judge Weinstein has noted, amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence
represent "courthouse door-closing initiatives ... based on exaggerated claims
of abuse. 199 Also, amending the Rule will open the door to greater possibilities
of discretionary abuse. In the same vein, defining and pin-pointing
"discretionary abuse" at the appellate level will become more problematic,
adding startling new twists to an already nebulous term. Moreover, an
amendment to Rule 702 will have an enormous substantive effect on state law
claims. As previously noted,2° ° diversity cases commenced in state courts
where the law allows the introduction of controversial expert opinions will be
removed to federal courts where the plaintiff will not be allowed to prove
causation. Thus, only those few lucky plaintiffs who share residence with the
allegedly responsible corporation will have legal recourse.
Amending Rule 702 is unnecessary for a variety of practical reasons. Overall,
this approach seems to be imbedded in an unfounded fear that allowing.
non-mainstream scientific opinions to reach the jury will result in a finding of
causation where it does not exist. Those who embrace this fear overlook both
the "David and Goliath" parallel with "Plaintiff and Corporation" and the
adversarial process. The legal and scientific resources at the disposal of most
defendants are often impressive and overwhelming.201 Thus, defendants who
have produced a substance alleged to be toxic will usually have easy access to
many scientists familiar with that substance; and defendants will not have
much trouble making it clear to a jury when a plaintiff's expert is either lying
or wrong.2 °2 Most importantly, there already exists sufficient mechanisms in
the Federal Rules of Evidence with which a trial judge may exclude the
occasional farcical scientist. 203
1 991d. at 633.
2 00See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
201See Bell, supra note 5, at 80 (noting that in Christopherson, the plaintiff's lawyer was
a solo practitioner who fought 16 lawyers of record for the defense, including four from
Washington D.C., representing amici Chemical Manufacturers Association and the
Product Liability Advisory Committee).
2 02See id. at 81 (noting, in addition, that across the full range of toxic tort cases there
is virtually no chance that defendants in toxic tort cases have been forced to pay for more
injuries than their substances have in fact caused. Because the law and science continue
to aim their efforts toward finding no causation where it in fact exists, strict scrutiny of
plaintiff's experts will only increase the overall inaccuracy of toxic tort verdicts.).
203 Judge Weinstein notes that:
[T]he vast bulk of cases in our courtrooms involve experts who testify
sensibly and truthfully. The exceptional as well as the routine cases can
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION
There are some abuses in expert witness practice. Indeed, abuse, like it or
not, is often imbedded in the human character. However, as contemplated by
the above discussion, the adversarial process was designed to reveal abuses of
the system: perjury, bias, and inconsistent statements of witnesses to namejust
a few. Inflexible rules of law, whether they be independent, judicially-created
pronouncements, or carefully and selectively crafted statutory enactments, add
nothing to a system often heralded for its problem-solving nature.
As advances in scientific techniques continue with awe-inspiring speed, the
current federal judicial practice of strict judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence
ensures that the legal system lags sadly behind. As one commentator
poignantly remarked:
When we are in the legal realm, where we need answers, you can't
tell the people of the country, . .. "we don't know to a scientific
certainty beyond all reasonable doubt exactly what did this, and
another 50 years worth of exposures will produce enough bodies for
us to be certain." That's not an answer. The law is more humane than
that, and the law says we've got to answer the question now.
20 4
Allowing this trend to continue will further erode the values of a neglected
adversarial system and ensure a rapid growth of industry at the expense of the
voluntary, as well as the involuntary, consumer. That will be no consolation to
those who have meritorious claims, stopped at the courthouse door holding a
late-breaking scientific methodology in hand that a jury was not allowed to
consider-especially if a few years later a conclusive study emerges revealing
causation beyond a reasonable doubt.205
be effectively handled by techniques presently available to the courts
without amending Rule 702. We ought not continue to succumb to a
tendency to inflate the size of problems and then to devise harsh and
unnecessary remedies that create far more harmful side effects than
advantages.
Weinstein, supra note 12, at 637-38.
204Blomquist, supra note 4, at 653 (quoting Toxic Trials (P.B.S. television broadcast,
Feb. 25,1986, statement of Tony Roisman at 24)).
205See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 1989).
After announcing thatplaintiff's expert should have been excluded and entering j.n.o.v.,
the court dauntingly stated: "However, we do not wish this case to stand as a bar to
future Bendectin cases in the event that new and conclusive studies emerge which would
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ADDENDUM
On the eve of the publication of this Note, the United States Supreme Court
announced its landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.2 06 In a remarkable, unanimous decision,207 penned by the Honorable
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court reversed the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.208 Accordingly, the Court held that the
"general acceptance" test of Frye v. United States can no longer stand as an
independent bar to the introduction of novel scientific evidence, and declared
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as the overriding source for determining whether
such evidence may be introduced at trial.209
Nevertheless, both sides in the dispute immediately claimed victory after
the High Court proclamation. 210 Because the Court's opinion leaves a host of
unanswered questions, perhaps the confusion is apt. Although the opinion
clearly removes the Frye talisman from the courthouse door, it is far from
providing future plaintiffs carte blanche with respect to advancing an expert
opinion to the jury's ear. In what will surely remain a divisive issue
surrounding expert evidence debates, the Court declared that the trial judge
maintain a role as "gatekeeper" when faced with contested scientific
testimony.211 Thus, as one commentator has noted, "the unmistakable victor
for now is the federal district court judge who wishes to exercise firm control
over dubious expert testimony."212
At the outset, the Court made two explicit findings regarding the Federal
Rules of Evidence which refine their scope and silence a few peripheral debates.
First, while reaffirming the "plain meaning" approach 213 to the interpretation
206113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
207Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, while concurring in the main
body of the decision, filed a dissenting opinion attacking part C, which sets forth
"general observations" for the trial court to consider. See infra notes 226-37 and
accompanying text.
208 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
209113 S. Ct. at 2794-95.
210 Marion Merrell Dow released this statement: "The United States Supreme Court
... today agreed with the legal position of Marion Merrell Dow ... that expert witnesses
testify only to claims that are scientific knowledge and not mere hypotheses or subjective
opinions." Marion Merrell Dow Comments On Court Case, PR NEWSWIRE, June 28,1993. In
stark contrast, plaintiffs' attorney Barry Nace stated: "What the Court is saying is you
put together the right kind of experts, and you've got a fact question for the jury."
"General Acceptance" Theory of Evidence No Longer Good Law, Suprente Court Rules, BNA
WASHINGTON INSIDER, June 29, 1993.
211113 S. Ct. at 2798.
21 2Margaret A. Berger, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Venerable Frye Standard, N.Y.L.J.,
July 19,1993, at S3.
2 13See supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
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of legislatively-enacted Federal Rules, 214 the Court confirmed, in unmistakable
terms, that the Federal Rules of Evidence are to be construed as liberal in thrust,
with Federal Rule of Evidence 402 providing the "baseline" for the
determination of admissibility issues.2 15 Second, the Court rejected the
Respondent's contention that the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 703
represented an assimilation of Frye,2 16 thus possibly ending residual doubt as
to whether any common law evidentiary standards survived the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.217
The inquiry under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 propounded by the Court
begins with an initial two-pronged finding by the trial court that the scientific
testimony at issue be reliable and relevant.218First, the Court explains that the
requirement that "'scientific knowledge' be the subject of an expert's
testimony, "establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."219 Within this
context the Court noted that the word "knowledge" "connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation."220 However, so-called "Junk
Science" alarmists should be careful to note that the Court stopped well short
of declaring that such "knowledge" be "known" to a certainty. Such a rigid
requirement, stated the Court, would be unreasonable inasmuch as "there are
no certainties in science."22 1
Second, the Court explains that Rule 702's mandate that the evidence or
testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue" requires that the trial judge find a "fit" between the facts of the
case and the evidence at issue, otherwise known as "relevance."22 2 The Court
used the study of the phases of the moon for illustration. Such a study may
provide valid scientific knowledge about whether it was dark on a given night,
214113 S. Ct. at 2793 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)).
215/d.
216 See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
217113 S. Ct. at 2792. "Frye made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test for admitting
expert scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent from and incompatible with
the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials." Id. at 2794.
218 d. at 2795.
219 d. It is also important to note that in a footnote, the Court explained that the
discussion is limited solely to the scientific context. This raises interesting questions as
to whether the holding in Daubert will apply to expert testimony that is "'technical, or
other specialized knowledge"' as contemplated by Rule 702 itself. Id. at 2795, n.8. It is
almost certain that this footnote will create satellite litigation. Perhaps a different
evidentiary standard will evolve regarding this rare type of expert testimony.
220d. at 2795.
221 d. (citing Amici Curiae Brief for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. at 9 stating "Indeed,
scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably 'true'-they are committed to
searching for new, temporary theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena".)
222113 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
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and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact.22 3
However, evidence of a full moon "will not assist the trier of fact in determining
whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on
that night."22 4 Expert testimony supporting a link between a full moon and
irrational behavior is not likely to be characterized as credible evidence for the
fact-finder's consideration. 22 5
While declining to "set out a definitive checklist or test,"2 26 the Court
announced some "general observations"22 7 which are likely to generate, rather
than settle, controversy. The Court observes that a key question for the trial
judge to consider is whether the theory or technique at issue "can be (and has
been) tested."228 Similarly, the Court encourages trial judges to consider
whether, in the case of a particular scientific technique, a rate of error is known
or can be known. 22 9 In his dissent attacking this portion of the Court's opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist fears that trial judges must become "amateur scientists"
in order to fulfill their role.230 Citing a quote which was meant to explain the
Court's statement,231 Chief Justice Rehnquist asserts: "I defer to no one in my
confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it
is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I
suspect some of them will be, too."232
The Court also notes that an important consideration for the trial court
should be whether the theory or technique at issue has been subjected to peer
review and publication. This "observation" is likely to become the crux of future
2231d.
224 d. at 2796.
225This particular passage may spawn some confusion as well. In using this
illustration, the Court unfortunately uses "irrational behavior" as the conclusion to be
reached through "evidence of a full moon." Although one would hardly dispute that
such evidence would be inadmissible in any forum, clever lawyering might allow this
discussion to be injected, by analogy, into a criminal trial. Such an attempt, if accepted
by a judge, would be a grave mistake and could lead to the exclusion, for example, of
psychiatric testimony offered by a criminal defendant in his defense. Perhaps the Court
would have been clearer in limiting the decision in Daubert to the civil context by stating,
for example, that "evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the
trier of fact in determining whether a manufacturer's tire was unusually likely to have
blown out on that night."




23 0/d. at 2800.
23 1See 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97 (citing KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:
THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) ("'[Tihe criterion of the scientific
status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability"').
232 /d. at 2800.
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litigational outcomes; and it will certainly be presented to courts of appeals as
an inappropriate factor to consider for purposes of determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Peer review, as previously noted,23 3 is at
odds with the truth seeking function of courts of law. Peer review is appropriate
as an avenue for academicians and scientists to engage in fruitful debate, and
perhaps to improve the quality of published literature. Subjecting an opinion
or technique to peer review, however, is not likely to significantly recast the
accuracy of the subject matter on the altar. Whether a majority of scientists agree
or disagree with particular opinions or techniques is simply a matter of
intellectual approbation, not axiomatic verity. As noted astronomer Carl Sagan
has stated, "majority science today may be minority science tomorrow."234
Finally, just when one thinks Frye can be safely relegated to the trash bin of
antiquated common law doctrine, the Court declares that "'general acceptance'
can yet have a bearing on the inquiry."235 Although the Court emphasizes that
the inquiry under Rule 702 is to be "a flexible one,"236 the inclusion of "general
acceptance" as an "observation" is perplexing after the Court's explicit holding
that the Frye standard is "austere ... and ... should not be applied in federal
trials."237 Although Frye operated as an exclusive bar to the introduction of
scientific testimony, it is highly doubtful that judges who once supported Frye
will be able to resist the temptation of excluding expert evidence because of the
lack of "general acceptance" of the opinion or technique, while conveniently
couching the decision among other "Daubert observations." Courts of Appeals
have, therefore, not seen the last of Frye.
In sum, while representing an expedient compromise between warring
factions, the United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., begs more questions than it answers. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist notes, "countless... questions will surely arise when hundreds of
district judges try to apply its teaching to particular offers of expert
testimony."238 Expert witness practice after Daubert will surely be as complex
as it was under Frye, which in turn leaves unanswered the question as to
whether Congress will reconsider the movement to amend Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.239
SCOT CHARLES WALKER
233 See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
234Tim Comwell, How "Junk Science" Has Been Put On Trial, THE INDEPENDENT, May
28, 1993, at 22.




239See supra note 18.
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